Fascism’s Trotsky

On November 15, 2017, in Articles, by natalt

by Oliver Hannah

Book review of Julius Evola, ‘Notes on the Third Reich’ (Arktos Media, 2013)

I. Introduction

I would rather live in a world in which I did not have to discuss Julius Streicher and his infamous anti-Semitic tabloid Der Stürmer (which got him hanged at Nuremberg), but recent events have forced that insalubrious topic into the forefront of my consciousness.

The Harvey Weinstein scandal gives us an instance of what Freud called the ‘return of the repressed’. The theme of the wealthy and powerful Jewish businessman, who exploits, molests and rapes German women, appears repeatedly in the salacious pages of Der Stürmer and the NSDAP propaganda of the 1930s, and it can be dismissed, by we moderns, as malicious propaganda, a figment of Streicher’s fevered imagination, or perhaps it could be taken as evidence of abuses by powerful Jews which did happen, but do not happen now. But the Weinstein scandal – and the fact that Weinstein-like behaviour is being revealed to be the rule and not the exception in Hollywood – disproves the latter contention. The stuff of NSDAP propaganda returns, again and again, and its arguments are repeatedly proven to be true.

Weinstein and the other ‘creatives’ are providing us with an example, not of life imitating art, but of art imitating life, or perhaps of art imitating politics. Both the female victim of the Jews and the male Jewish victimisers are repeating a pattern of behaviour which was first observed – in modern times at least – in Germany eighty to ninety years ago. In other words, the world has not moved on.

This goes some way to explaining why Evola’s Notes on the Third Reich is relevant – politically and culturally. Because of its subject matter, it may be even more timely than Evola’s other books (on Tantric sex, Yoga, Buddhism, Existentialism, beatniks, hippies…).

When evaluating a political book, we must carefully consider the context in which it was written and the reasons why it was written. Notes was written in 1970 and published as part of his 1974 book (which appeared in the year of his death) Fascism viewed from the Right. Evola had been drawing up a post-mortem of (what Yockey calls) the ‘Resurgence of Authority’ with the intention of buttressing his reputation as the éminence grise of Europe’s post-war Far Right. In the Mussolini years – from 1922 to 1945 – he had been an overlooked and obscure fascist intellectual, and he had come to prominence in Italy only in 1951, when he was put on trial for attempting to revive fascism. He managed to confound his prosecutors with the argument that, if he was a fascist, then so was Plato, so was de Maistre, so were many other thinkers in the European tradition; and as a result the charges were dropped. But those who are familiar with Evola’s work come to the conclusion that he was as guilty as charged. He belongs squarely in the tradition of such post-war ideologues Leon Degrelle, Francis Parker Yockey, Otto Remer, Maurice Bardèche…

But unlike the aforementioned men (and like his contemporary, Oswald Mosley, who had attempted to revive his political career after the war), he repudiated the theory, and much of the practice, of the Resurgence, and in Notes he calls for a moving away from it. He writes, of West Germany, ‘It seems to have been unable to conceive of a “third way”, of the Right, far from both the totalitarianism of the National Socialist Führer-Staat and democracy and Marxism: a third way in which, when adequately rectified and restored to their origins, some of the ideas that acted in the preceding period [pre-war Germany] could have been considered’. This would have redeemed post-war Germany from the ‘incredible ideological vacuum in its worldview’. Such a Germany ‘could constitute a much more valid element in the generation of a European alternative to capitalism and communism’ (p. 86).

Now at first sight, this does not seem objectionable: no-one on the Far Right today wants to bring back the Resurgence of Authority, without modification, in the same way that some hoary leftists want to bring back, for instance, Stalinism – at least no-one except for a few eccentric and isolated individuals. But I argue that Evola’s criticisms of the Resurgence were not constructive but destructive, and that he functioned, in effect, as a Trotskyist.

One can define a Trotskyist as a Marxist-Leninist who adheres to Trotsky’s famous doctrines – of the permanent revolution, the transitional program, etc. But this would be taking a shallow view; a [pamphlet] (https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-4/mrl/section2.htm), A Critique of Ultra-Leftism, Dogmatism and Sectarianism (1977) by an obscure American communist group, the Movement for a Revolutionary Left (Eugene, Oregon) gives us a much better understanding of what Trotskyism is. The authors distinguish between a Trotskyism of deeds (the ‘materialist’ definition) and a Trotskyism of thoughts or intents (the ‘idealist’ definition). One can behave like a Trotskyist without identifying as a Trotskyist as such, and vice versa.

According to the MRL authors, the true Trotskyist regards all existing communist regimes (at the time of writing) as being run by scammers and sell-outs. ‘The essence of what the Marxist-Leninist tradition including Stalin, Mao, Fidel and Ho Chi Minh have meant by “trotskyism” is a left-adventurist and dogmatic analysis which condemns all existing socialist countries and people’s democracies as not really socialist, being run by bureaucrats or perhaps state capitalists acting against the interests of the working people, and which likewise condemns all massive popular, progressive, or Communist led movements as being insufficiently revolutionary or in the process of selling out the masses in the interests of a bureaucracy, either local or located in the USSR, China, etc’. On the face of it, this sounds like anarchism or left-communism or one of their variants. But the difference between them and Trotskyism lies in Trotsky’s purportedly swearing allegiance to the principles of Lenin and the Bolshevik revolution of 1917:

Trotskyism differs from the anarchists who make similar claims about all progressive and socialist movements and regimes by claiming adherence to the principles of Leninism, endorsing the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and organizing themselves more or less according to Leninist principles. This is the essence of trotskyism and the sole criteria by which a group or current should be categorized as “trotskyist.”

As an example of Trotskyism in practice, they cite the example of the Progressive Labor Party (an American Trotskyist group which is still around). The Party condemns ‘China, the USSR, Cuba and ail progressive and socialist regimes as well as the CPUSA, RCP, CL, SWP and all other groups in the U.S., all progressive, socialist or national liberation movements in Third World countries, and all progressive and Communist lead movements in the advanced capitalist countries’. It accuses these leftist rivals of ‘selling out the masses’, of being ‘tools of the Soviet or Chinese bureaucracies’. It ‘sees itself as the only truly revolutionary group in the world’. The PLP is to be contrasted with other leftist groups, which are avowedly Trotskyist but at the same time support the mainstream of the communist movement and the communist regimes in power:

On the other hand a splinter group from the Socialist Workers Party (the main Trotskyist group in the U.S.), the Workers World Party and its youth group Youth Against War and Fascism, gives basic support to Third World national liberation movements and socialist regimes such as those of the Cubans, Vietnamese, Angolans, etc., and (at least at last look) considered China and other socialist countries to be socialist. Thus in spite of their positive attitude about Leon Trotsky they can not be considered to be “trotskyists.”

The authors go on to sum up a few other essential tenets of the Trotskyist creed, but for our purposes, we need not proceed with the pamphlet any further. We have, in the above, a working definition of Trotskyism is. Moreover, we can imagine how a Trotskyism of the Right would look. It would oppose the Resurgence of Authority in Germany, 1933 to 1945, Italy, 1922 to 1945, and Europe, 1940 to 1945. It would, at the same time, proclaim fidelity to the underlying principles of the Resurgence, and even to the original spirit and intent of the revolution in Germany in 1933 and Italy in 1922.

As to why all this is important, I will save my main argument for the end of the essay. For now, I will point out that, if anything in life is certain, this evening we will see on 4Chan /pol/ – the biggest Far Right Internet forum in the world – a new thread or threads, with hundreds of replies, debating the merits of the Resurgence of Authority. The vast majority of the posters will be young – the grandchildren and great-children of those Europeans who lived through the war – and of white and European descent. These represent the future, not the past, of the Far Right movement, and perhaps of the West itself; significantly, they regard the Resurgence (which was crushed, mercilessly, seventy years ago) as being part of that future. They see it as a living, and not a dead, idea.

II. Evola and the Jews

Evola writes a great deal on the topic of the Jews, and none of what he writes is favourable. In one typical passage, he sums up the Harvey Weinstein type of Jew: ‘To the modern secular Jew was attributed a materialist view of life and a corresponding praxis, greed for money, an inclination to unscrupulous speculation…, rationalism and ‘modernism’ in their corrosive, anti-traditional aspects, the dishonesty of a double moral standard when dealing with non-Jews, as well as everything that can derive, even without a conscious intent, from his condition of being a ‘rootless’ man… and finally a thirst for power (as ‘overcompensation’ for the inferiority complex created in him by the vile conditions for centuries on the “chosen people”)’ (p. 60).

Given that, one would expect him to be largely sympathetic to the anti-Semitism of the NSDAP and its associated parties. But no:

As Hitler professed it… anti-Semitism had the character of an obsessive fanaticism. It was the sign of a lack of inner control, and it is because of it that there is a stain that is difficult to remove from the Third Reich. (p. 55)

This comes after page after page of Evola saying terrible things about the Jews.

To cap it off, in Evola’s view (and this is the same criticism levelled by some white nationalists against the NSDAP) the NSDAP spoiled racialism, which had a distinguished pedigree before it was sullied by Hitler and his sordid, obsessive anti-Semitism: ‘The common error that racism and anti-Semitism are regarded by many people as synonyms also has its principal origin in Hitlerism’ (Ibid).

In the introduction, we recounted how Jews and non-Jews tend to be stuck in cycles, recurring patterns, in their interactions with one another; this is especially the case when it comes to the political. Instead of attempting to make peace with their political opponents, or even to try and work out why it is their opponents are so aggrieved with them, organised Jewry tends to cede nothing and demand everything; it will ramp up and escalate conflict, even when it would be prudent not to do so; it will demonise their opponents, reviling them as the worst sort of human beings, and call for them to be ruined economically, fined, imprisoned… In short, it plays a zero-sum game, and it has been playing it for a long time.

Evola understands this. At the same time, he holds that, if Jews behaved this way in the 1930s, the fault lay in Hitler:

Hitler’s attitudes created a kind of diabolical vicious circle. Since his ideas about Jews and the struggle against them had already been proclaimed in the party’s first programme, it was bound to polarise against Germany – increasingly, the more Nazism gained ground – all of international Judaism, which inter alia controlled a good part of the large information agencies. In turn, this polarisation reinforced Hitler’s ferocious anti-Semitism by furnishing him with a justification for his beliefs, and so on and so forth. (Ibid).

Strangely, Evola gives full credence to the Holocaust stories which were beginning – some thirty years after the war – to take root. He recounts the mawkish tale of a German ocean liner, the MS St. Louis, filled with over 900 German Jews who sought refuge in Cuba and Florida in May 1939 and who were denied entry; ‘In the end, they sank the ship in despair’ (p. 56). The editor of the Arktos edition, John Morgan, points out in a footnote that this story is not true: most of the passengers, after going back to Europe, were accepted as refugees, and the ship was not scuttled by its own passengers. As to why Evola included this story, and why he focused on that particular group of refugees of the 1930s – and not on any of the tens of thousands of Germans, for instance, who had fled Czechoslovakia and Poland in that same decade – it is not clear. But he then goes on to make the extraordinary (for one of his political background) claim that the Holocaust actually happened: ‘The physical liquidation of Jews.. has to be seen as taking place in the period of the war in the territories occupied by Germany…’. He declares primly: ‘For these massacres, about which the greater part of the German people learned only later, no justification or excuse can be accepted’ (p. 56).

At the time, the Holocaust – and Holocaust Revisionism – were in their infancy, and research into the subject which could have debunked the Allied and Jewish propaganda claims was lacking. One of the early revisionists, Austin J. App, admitted that he had little to no documentary or forensic proof that the Germans had not exterminated the six million Jews – he only had a belief in the innate goodness of the German people. Now, Evola exonerates the ‘greater part of the German people’, but he condemns – without trial – the NSDAP, SS and other associated organisations (including the Italian). Given that he spent much of the 1930s, and the war, in the company of the men of these organisations, and would have had an intimate, first-hand knowledge of them and their character, he should have known better; perhaps he could shown a belief in their ‘innate goodness’.

The same applies when he attributes war guilt to the adventurism of Hitler and the NSDAP, their lust for Lebensraum, etc., here sounding very much like Roosevelt or Churchill – and the prosecutors at Nuremberg. Given the circles he moved in, from 1939 to 1945, he could not have failed to have been aware of the (sometimes quite complex) justifications on the Axis side for the partition of Czechoslovakia, the war with Poland, the war with the USSR… This makes it difficult to take Evola seriously – not because the Axis line on these thorny political questions was always entirely correct, but because Evola shows no signs, in Notes, of being exposed to it. He comes across as a political naïf, a simpleton.

III. Evola and the German worker

Evola subscribed to ‘Tradition’, an occult doctrine which underlies, according to its followers, all the world’s myths and religions. According to Traditionalism, another, spiritual world exists adjacent to this one – a world of ‘being’ as opposed to ‘becoming’, the eternal and divine as opposed to the transitory and profane. The political implication of this – which is not apparent at first sight – is that kings and emperors of the ancient world, being semi-divine, owed their legitimacy to their contact or intuition of this world of ‘being’. They were set apart from humanity by it and consecrated by it. This ‘regal’ or ‘solar’ spirituality existed apart from spiritualities of a more inferior type, which he refers to as ‘telluric’ (earth-bound) or even ‘demonic’ (in his Revolt Against the Modern World (1934), he implies that such a backwards spirituality is the property of the non-white races).

Evola saw the Dark Ages and the period of the founding of the Holy Roman Empire as the high point of Western civilisation. Since then, we have seen a steady descent – into liberalism, democracy, egalitarianism – which terminates in Marxism. In the Weimar Era, remnants (but only remnants) of the old, medieval order survived in Germany’s aristocrats, nobles, Junkers, elite soldier caste, student fencing societies. But, on the whole, these were on the way out and by themselves not enough to save Germany.

As a consequence of all this, Evola criticises the NSDAP ideology on two main points. The first was that its leaders lacked anything like the divine chrism of the ancient god-kings – indeed, they drew their legitimacy, not from ‘being’, but from the support of the Volk, the masses. Hitler enraptured in them in a disgusting, almost Dionysian way. ‘Everything gravitated around a man with exceptional abilities for captivating, transporting, arousing and fanaticising the people, while he himself presented under more than one aspect the traits of a possessed person, as if an extraordinary force were acting through him, giving him lucidity and iron logic in action, but depriving him of every sense of limit’ (p. 35). This Volkish notion of democracy formed the foundation of the movement:

Judged straightforwardly, the Third Reich presented itself in terms of a popular dictatorship, since power was in the hands of any superior chrism, drawing the principle of its ‘legitimacy’ uniquely from the Volk and its consensus… Hitler… nourished a fundamental aversion to the monarchy and, as we have noted, his polemic against the Hapsburgs, for instance, was of an unparalleled vulgarity. For Hitler, the Volk alone was the principle of legitimacy. He was established as its direct representative and guide, without intermediaries, and it was to follow him unconditionally. No higher principle existed or was tolerated by him. Therefore it is perfectly correct to speak of a consolidated populist dictatorship employing the tools of a single party and the myth of the Volk. (pp. 34-35)

Evola sounds as though he were inclined to the conservatives who preceded Hitler – the Hindenburgs, the von Papens, the Schleichers; also that he would have supported the Prussian conservatives who attempted to topple Hitler in the July 1944 bomb plot. But he is dismissive of the latter, and admits that the former lacked the political will, and popular support, to achieve anything. (But National Socialist Germany was founded upon the popular will, the will of the Volk. For this reason, NSDAP legal and constitutional theory rejects the accusation that National Socialist Germany was run by a ‘dictatorship’; Hitler refused to call himself a dictator).

The second objection to the NSDAP ideology (closely related to the first) was that the NSDAP exhibited too much of a proletarian class character. ‘The presence of a proletarian aspect in Nazism is undeniable, as in the figure of Hitler himself, who had none of the traits of a ‘gentleman’, of an aristocratic type di razza [of race, i.e., of a distinguished character and bearing]’ (p. 43). In other words, Hitler was a yob, and the NSDAP was composed of yobs. ‘This proletarian aspect and even vulgarity of National Socialism was often noticed, especially in Austria after its annexation to the Reich and after the phase of a rash “national” infatuation of Austrians for “Greater Germany”‘ (Ibid).

Evola carries his disdain of the plebeian to ridiculous lengths:

Hitler… assured [the working class] a maximum of bourgeois comfort, and by adopting the insipid slogan of the ‘nobility of labour’ gave workers a particular ‘consciousness’. Sometimes, however, he went too far, which gave us the first taste of the presumptuous rabble with more money than they know what to do with, and which, like a real plague in our days, proliferates in the ‘consumer society’. Anyone who has seen the masses of ‘Aryan’ Volksgenossen (the comrades of the stock, the Volk) of the KdF [Strength through Joy] (a sort of first class ‘workers club’ or Nazi ENAL, the [Italian] National Agency for Workers’ Assistance) and the presumption of the evolved and ‘deproletarianised’ Berlin worker cannot suppress a shiver of horror at the prospect of a Germany that might have developed in that direction. (p. 42)

Perhaps you had to be there, as Evola was, to understand his point of view. Certainly we moderns cannot. From his reading his speeches, and even Table Talk, we get the impression that Hitler was a man of taste, culture and refinement. We find very little discussions of music, opera, painting, architecture in the writings and speeches of Churchill and Stalin – or of our contemporary leaders. As for the German workers and the Strength through Joy holidaymakers, the newsreel footage from that time (if it is anything to go by) indicates that they were a stylish, well-dressed, well-groomed, well-behaved people, and that they seemed healthier, and more fit, than the Europeans of today (especially the English).

In summary, Evola asks for too much. He says some good things about racialism: ‘The fact remains that, even from the point of view of the Right, a certain balanced consciousness and dignity of “race” can be considered as salutary, if we think where we have ended up in our days with the exaltation of the Negro and all the rest, the psychosis of anti-colonialism, and ‘integrationist’ fanaticism, all of which are phenomena occurring parallel to the decline of Europe and the West as a whole’ (p. 54) – these are words that could have been written today. But according to him, racial homogeneity alone will not do the trick. ‘Today we see populations like the Norwegian, Swedish and Dutch that present a high degree of racial and even “Nordic” purity, but within they are more or less lifeless, spiritually bastardised, and deprived of the virtues that characterised them in other epochs’ (Ibid). Many on the Far Right – and not just on the Far Right – in Norway, Holland, and Sweden would give anything to get their 1970-era racial and Nordic purity back, lifeless, virtue-less and spiritually bastardised as it was.

IV. Conclusion

Evola mixes praise and criticism in his assessment of National Socialist Germany. He finds the Reich Labour Service ‘deplorable’ (p. 43) but gives high marks to NSDAP policy when it came to labour, big business and the peasantry. He dislikes the racial doctrine of the SS, but overall approves of the organisation.

Trotsky proved to be especially dangerous to Bolshevism because he knew it from the inside and had stood at the top; he did not look at it from the vantage point of an outsider, i.e., a non-communist or anti-communist. On top of that, he understood enough of the psychology of his followers to make sure not to be total in his condemnation of the Bolshevik system; it had done great things, and would continue to do so, with the right men at the helm. The present rulers were not faithful – unlike himself – to the founding principles of the movement. He himself possessed a solid grasp of those principles (and even his critics concede this) and would not deviate from them.

Evola, in Notes, matches Trotsky on every point. Like Trotsky, he knew his stuff. It should be remembered that Evola started out as a poet and an artist, and throughout his career he showed a remarkable gift for painting pictures with words. He viewed, correctly, the Resurgence of Authority to be as much an aesthetic phenomenon as a political one, and his writing manages to convey – through symbols, metaphors, images – its aesthetics.

The corollary of this is that Evola has the ability to make you believe. His ‘Third Way’ can come about; the Resurgence of Authority can be dusted off and reintroduced into Europe, once it has been freed of incorrectly thought-out doctrines and the baggage of unpleasant events in the recent historical past.

Perhaps we could understand Evola’s giving ground on some key points – on the massacre of the Jews, for instance – as a cynical ploy designed to win over liberal Europeans who believe everything they are told about Germany’s conduct during the war. It could be compared to Bush 45’s recent attack on Trump, which has alienated Trump’s followers, but has won praise from liberals and Never Trump conservatives.

The trouble is that one could not perform such a feat of surgery – amputating the ‘good’ parts of the Resurgence from the ‘bad’ – in 1970, and one could certainly not do it now. The Left makes such a task too difficult. Since Trump’s victory, and the unfortunate events at Charlottesville, it has become obsessed by ‘Nazism’ and has become overtaken by an anti-fascist, anti-Nazi hysteria. It sees Nazism, fascism, racism, everywhere, even where it is not. The Left – which controls most of the institutions in the entire Western world – is going through one of its periodic bouts of delusion which lead in turn to murderous violence; it is following in the footsteps of the Stalinists in the purges of the 1930s and the Maoists in the upheavals of the 1960s. (One could say, following Evola, that Leftists are possessed by a ‘demonic’ spirituality). Conservatives, and the cowardly bourgeoisie, being easily intimidated, have become frightened by all this. As a result, anything resembling Evola’s ‘Third Way’ can hardly count on their support.

In addition, Evola’s criticisms may prove to be destructive to the cause he champions. The Scots philosopher Hume writes that governments everywhere are founded on opinion: change men’s opinions, and you change the mode of government. All politicians have understood this fact. Stalin certainly understood it; the greatest threat to Bolshevism came, not from public revulsion to its famines and mass killings – the Soviet people were too beaten-down and apathetic to put up much resistance – but from nuisances such as Trotsky, who sought to poison the minds of the Bolshevik cadre. Inexperienced and less knowledgeable communists could easily become confused by a Trotsky. They would ask themselves why it was this man, who has excellent credentials, being a powerful speaker and writer, and a man who has distinguished himself militarily and politically, is so critical and antagonistic towards the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik regime. Naturally enough, they would think that Trotsky’s criticisms, given his record, carry weight – that there must be something in them. To Stalin, Trotskyism proved to be a thorn in the side of the Soviet Union, and it continued to be so even after Trotsky’s death. The problem the Soviets faced was that a newcomer to communism, who is interested in Marxist-Leninism, could easily mistake Trotskyism for the real thing, and as a result, could be sidetracked into the useless and ineffectual Trotskyist cult. The Soviet Union, then, would lose yet another believer. And if the Soviet Union were to haemorrhage enough believers in ‘socialism’, then the entire structure would keel over. Governments, to repeat, are founded on opinions…

It is an old truism that one must compromise in order to make a political idea reality. The NSDAP’s world view was composed of various ideas existing in the air in Germany at the time, and certain old practices and institutions. The party, and Hitler, managed to gather them up and focus them at one central point. In order for an idea to be understood in the form of a person, who must be clearly visible to the people; he cannot conceal his identity from them and hide behind a mask, like the Antifa or Anonymous. Evola knows this: ‘As long as Hitler lived and fortune was on his side, his galvanising power succeeded in holding everything together and inspiring unbelievable achievements up to the last hour, up to the edge of the abyss’ (p. 36). In other words, you cannot make an abstraction the head of state; you require a leader of flesh and blood. But to Evola, that fact shows up a fundamental weakness in human nature and the Third Reich: ‘The complete ideological collapse of Germany after 1945, however, when that tension failed – not comparable to the one that followed its defeat in the First World War – shows how superficial was the effect of his magnetic action on the masses in spite of the power of “myths” and the strict totalitarian organisation’ (Ibid). Yes, the Third Reich here showed a lack of (in the jargon of business management theory) successor planning; but this was all the more reason for those who were sympathetic to the Resurgence of Authority to get behind the man who, for a short time, embodied its ideals.

Like Evola, the high-brow professional anti-Semite Kevin MacDonald prefers abstractions over realities. From reading his Occidental Observer, we can see that he regards the Jewish question as the most important thing in the world. But, oddly enough, he refuses to discuss the topic of the Third Reich, or Holocaust Revisionism, and is known for deleting articles on those subjects – popular articles which have garnered a wide readership – from his site. One would think that, given the importance of anti-Semitism in MacDonald’s world view, and that Hitler and the NSDAP were the only widespread, white and European political movement which made action on the Jewish question (they proffered a Final Solution, in fact) a fundamental plank in their platform, MacDonald would devote plenty of time and space to them. But he seems embarrassed and ashamed of them.

Reading Notes has proven to be an eye-opener for me, and makes me question the value of the entire Traditionalist project. Perhaps its ‘revolt against the modern world’ signifies an inability to cope with the world. Politics can be a dull business. One only has to read Hitler’s speeches on the German auto industry, and Germany’s traffic laws, to see that. It is more than likely that the divine kings, pharaohs, emperors of Evola’s ancient Traditionalist societies had to, just like Hitler, concern themselves with equally as mundane matters. But Evola is unable to recognise this.

 

One Response to Fascism’s Trotsky

  1. nineofclubs says:

    The idea of Evola as a far-Right Trotsky is a novel one, but you’ve put forward a compelling case for it here.

    By this logic, would you regard other ‘Resurgence of Authority’ dissidents – eg Otto Strasser – similarly? Or does there come a point where the ideas being promoted by the dissenter are sufficiently different from the original concept that they should be seen as something new?

    To continue with the socialist analogy, at what point does a Trotsky (claiming to represent the ‘true’ socialism) become a Tito (adhering to socialist principles but modifying them in accordance with his own views)?

    .

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